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Abstract
This paper studies platform ecosystems, a novel
business entity built upon a platform coordinating the
interactions between suppliers and users, particularly
in the IT service sectors. Borrowing words from two
core firm theories resource-based view (RBV) and
transaction cost view (TCV), we propose that the
platform ecosystem works at the boundary between
“market and hierarchy.” To show this, we develop a
conceptual, stylized, dynamic model for the platform
ecosystem with typical notions in RBV and TCV: in
particular, installed-base, player heterogeneity, and
platform’s investment as primary ingredients. Our
findings from equilibrium analyses and simulations
largely confirm that both RVB and TCV are valid for
understanding a platform ecosystem. We, however, also
identify some contingencies where RBV is limited, and
propose a hypothesis that the platform’ investment is
more crucial for fostering an ecosystem. This implies
that the platform starts from the point near market and
maneuvers the ecosystem toward a hierarchy, utilizing
its investment as a driver.

1. Introduction
With IT becoming prevalent in our society, the
platform business has emerged as a novel solution for
production and delivery of various IT services.
Facebook, and Google represent the most successful
cases of the platform business. Such a new business
form, however, usually constructs its own business
ecosystem by engaging diverse participants: users,
input suppliers, and other types of complementors ([6]
[11] [27]). Accordingly, the value creation mechanism
undergoes a major transformation. For example, the
platforms within their ecosystems do not always show
the profit-maximizing behavior ([15] [19]). Further, the
value creation mechanism is different from the one in
the traditional value chain model ([23]). For example,
the way that value is created in the models of twosided market or multi-sided platform ([8] [14] [24])
can be hardly described as a linear value chain. The
non-linear interactions among the participants in an
industry or an ecosystem can be described with the
notion of ‘value network ([1] [22]).’ However, the
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platform ecosystems present additional dimensions
upon their network structures due to the active role of
the platforms ([9] [11]), thereby enhancing non-linear
value creation. We observe this nonlinearity in a
platform ecosystem, and develop a stylized model from
the perspectives of firm theory for deep understanding
of its organizational nature.
This study proposes a novel conceptual model that
analyzes the value creation mechanism on the basis of
interactions across the platform’s participants. For
acquiring a new perspective on platform ecosystems,
we first consider the relationship between market and
hierarchy ([29]) in the firm theory. In particular, the
value creation mechanism in the platform ecosystems
is studied on the basis of two representative
perspectives on firms: that is, resource-based view
(RBV) and transaction cost view (TCV). According to
RBV, the accumulated participants turn into the
platform’s idiosyncratic assets ([25]). And TCV
requires the platform’s active responses to reduce the
transaction costs across the participants ([7] [11]).
Our stylized model presents an abstraction of the
service operations organized by a platform through the
lens of both perspectives. We also focus on the
leadership of the platform to create a virtuous circle of
creating value and sustaining the ecosystem. In
particular, we aim to derive answers to the following
questions from our model and analysis:
 Will the size of active players (users and suppliers
participating in a platform ecosystem) reinforce the
platform’s leadership in an ecosystem?
 Will the platform’s investment to reduce the
transaction costs borne by the participants encourage
the prosperity of the entire ecosystem?
 What are the contingencies and the drivers that
affect the growth path of the platform ecosystem?
What implications do these factors have for the
platform’s role: e.g., market vs. hierarchy?

2. Market, organization, and platform
ecosystem
2.1 Understanding of platform ecosystems
The early development of the value chain models
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helped establish the fundamental framework for linear
production systems in the era of mass production
([23]). Here, value is created through the activities of a
chain of players, who are arranged in one direction
along a straight line starting from the suppliers and
ending at the customers. With great recognition of the
importance of efficient supply chain management, this
model is most suitable for sequential productions with
value added step-by-step along the chain.
However, recent phenomena, particularly observed
in the IT service sectors, present a new aspect of value
creation. This calls for a novel theory to integrate the
firm theories in a new style. As is evident from the
success stories of global giant platforms such as Apple,
Facebook, Google, etc., the current wave characterized
by keywords like “social” and “mobile” makes the
service lifecycle short and require agility in the value
creation mechanism. To cope with these challenges,
flexible partnerships are necessary, and a player acting
as a pivot is required in many situations. Platforms are
now playing this role. They organize resources from
diverse partners (e.g., complementors, input suppliers,
and distributors) and coordinate their varied interests.
As a result, it is no longer remarkable characteristics or
technology owned by a single company but a holistic
complex body comprising multiple inputs from various
participants that determines competitive advantage.
Accordingly, the business paradigm has shifted, at least
in the IT service sectors, from a stand-alone business
model led by a flagship company to a community-like
one built upon a platform ([15]).
This outlook indicates that platforms lie at the
center of value creation. However, they also present a
new challenge in terms of understanding and analyzing
the value creation mechanism based on a platform.
Traditional frameworks such as the value chain model
fall short of capturing the essential features of platform
activities. Indeed, many participants with diverse
interests in the platform business interact with each
other quite differently from those in the value chain.
First, the partners of a platform belong to different
business fields or industries and form more than a
simple supplier-buyer relationship. The structure of
their relationships cannot be properly described as a
chain of dyadic relations; rather, it is closer to a
network. Therefore, a linear model fails in modeling
the mechanism of value creation by a platform.
In order to emphasize this difference, we employ
the term “platform ecosystem,” which is now
frequently encountered in literature ([9] [15] [17] [18]
[19] [20]). In our platform ecosystem, the platform
establishes the strategic position as a keystone and
takes charge of as well as responsibility for creating
values throughout the ecosystem. All the core
transactions are mediated by the platform that hinders

service flows from running along multiple paths. This
fundamental feature of a platform ecosystem lies in the
role of the platform in connecting different needs that
otherwise could not access each other ([14]). Thus, a
platform creates a new marketplace which could not
exist without it (in this regard, the platform works as if
it were a market). Moreover, the value in a platform
ecosystem is not added in a step-by-step fashion
following a chain of dyadic relations; instead, it reveals
itself at the final delivery stage.
However, a platform cannot exclusively possess all
the resources. Thus, it needs to be open and share some
components of its resources in order to foster its
ecosystem. However, a platform does not fully open
everything. It may open core resources but maintains
its control over those resources ([4] [6] [7] [12] [13]).
Owing to this loosely coupled governance, the entire
ecosystem is able to achieve a balance between
openness and control, and makes the entire ecosystem
look as if an organization: e.g., a balance between
proprietary and non-proprietary assets ([7] [16]).
The delineation above reveals the underlying
reason for the linear value chain model not being
applicable to the platform ecosystems. In fact, the
unique nature of the platform could be confirmed by its
behavior in practice. For example, the basic principle
upon which a platform organizes and leads an
ecosystem—the organizing principle—does not seem
to be based on sheer profit-seeking driver ([8] [10] [11]
[15] [19] [20]). Rather, the organizing principle seems
to emerge as a product of evolution, in which the
participants coordinate and compete with each other,
and interact with and adapt to various environmental
factors. In the course of platform’s growth, its fitness
largely depends on the efficiency and agility generated
from its relationships with its partners.

2.2 Firm theories applied to platform ecosystem
The primary objective of our study is to find the
key characteristics of platform ecosystems from the
organizational perspective. This viewpoint bears not
only theoretical but also practical implications since
many legislation and policy issues around the platform
ecosystems are closely related with their organizational
nature. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate some key
notions from the firm theory into our framework. We
started with following the traditional development of
the firm theory, and finally decided to consider two
major streams in this areaTCV (transaction cost
view) and RBV (resource-based view)to develop a
stylized model representing the essential features of the
platform ecosystems through the lens of firm theory.
First, TCV ([5] [29]) requests a platform’s
aggressive actions to reduce the transaction costs
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across the participants: e.g., developing efficient
interfaces, standardizing inter-operations, providing
SDK. Meanwhile, RBV ([2] [3] [21] [26] [28]) asserts
that the network woven by the participants in an
ecosystem generates new assets. For example, the fact
that the connections between the participants should be
mediated by a platform empowers the platform and
strengthens its keystone position: e.g., leveraging the
network externality. Thus, RBV suggests that the new
assets generated by the forging the links between the
participants establish core competency for the
prosperity of the ecosystems (e.g., accumulated
participants as a platform’s idiosyncratic asset; [25]).
In our stylized model, the platform tries to leverage
both transaction efficiency (TCV) and asset specificity
(RBV). The goal of our modelling and analyses is to
gain an insight into the role of platform leadership
toward a value-creation virtuous cycle throughout an
ecosystem. Specifically, we are interested in the
following aspects of the platform ecosystems:
 Investments on platform infrastructure (‘infra’ in
brief): Infra provided by a platform is a fundamental
base of value creation for the sake of the participants
in its ecosystem. For this purpose, the platform
needs to regularly invest in its infrastructure so that
it can maintain and improve transaction efficiency.
 Participatory base: The participants such as
complementors not only give a boost to an
ecosystem but also contribute as an idiosyncratic
asset to the platform, for example, by attracting
other potential participants. Because of this feature
of the participants, the platform provides many
incentives to expand its participatory base (e.g., free
subscription, low licensing fee, subsidy, etc.).
 Holistic ecosystem value: The total value created
through an ecosystem does not necessarily translate
directly into profits of the platform (this makes the
value creation mechanism nonlinear, as explained
above). However, the platform still undertakes the
responsibility for the holistic value. In this regard,
the platform can be viewed to exist not for
maximizing its profit but for fostering the ecosystem
by inducing potential participants to join the system
and promoting transactions across the participants.

3. Service operations in platform ecosystem
3.1 Platform ecosystem model
In our model, the platform ecosystem is composed
of three echelons: (potential) suppliers – platform –
(potential) users. Potential suppliers and users are
horizontally differentiated. As for the user group U, a

user is given an index 𝑢𝑢 according to his/her
preference toward service diversity, which is assumed
to be determined by the number of suppliers on the
other side. Suppliers are similarly differentiated based
on the level of cost or inefficiency. Specifically, we
define U ≡ [0, 𝑢𝑢�] and S ≡ [0, 𝑠𝑠̅], where users and
suppliers are populated over the sets U and S,
respectively. Potential users and suppliers are
horizontally differentiated according to the functions
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) , each of which represents the
preference strength of user 𝑢𝑢 and the cost
(inefficiency) factor of supplier 𝑠𝑠, respectively. Users
are populated on U in a descending order of 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢)
(𝑑𝑑 ′ (𝑢𝑢) < 0). On the other hand, suppliers are arranged
in an ascending order of 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) (𝑞𝑞 ′ (𝑠𝑠) > 0).
The payoff functions of a user 𝑢𝑢 ∈ U and a
supplier 𝑠𝑠 ∈ S are defined as follows ( ζ𝑡𝑡 ≠ 0
assumed). Hereafter, the subscript ‘𝑡𝑡’ represents the
corresponding time period. (For the sake of enhanced
readability, however, we sometimes drop ‘𝑡𝑡’ when its
omission does not seem to cause any confusion.)
𝜇𝜇(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢)ζ𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠)�ζ𝑡𝑡

Eq. 1
Eq. 2

Eq. (1) indicates that user’s payoff is determined by
the strength of preference toward the diversity and the
service fee 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 that he/she pays for the services
delivered through the platform. Furthermore, the
benefit is proportional to the level of efforts (ζ𝑡𝑡 ) that
the platform puts on for maintaining and improving
transaction quality. Thus, this investment is assumed to
strengthen the indirect network externality.
Suppose that each supplier provides one unit of
input or contribution (either product or service). Then,
with given price 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 for their services, the payoff of
supplier 𝑠𝑠 (∈ S) is set by Eq. (2). The suppliers’
benefits are also affected by the positive indirect
network externality from the user side. However, there
is a negative network externality in the supplier side,
which indicates the competition costs imposed upon
the active suppliers. Hereafter, the former (positive)
externality will be simply called the “network effect”
and the latter the “congestion effect.” Also note that the
investment of the platform helps to improve suppliers’
transactions, thereby reducing the actual operating
costs and alleviating the congestion effect.
Now, our platform seeks its profit not by leveraging
price structure (as typical platforms in two-sided
market models do) but by managing the installedbases, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 . This assumption fits well our
viewpoint on the platform described in Section 2 (also
refer to the role of platforms explained there). Further,
we also assume a myopic platform since the behaviors

5297

of most platforms in practice do not seem to be
consistent with those of perfectly forward-looking
players. Therefore, at the point of decision (refer to
Fig. 1), the platform’s concerns reduce to one step
change (i.e., net increase or decrease during the
corresponding period) of participants.
And many platforms in practice are trying to
maintain (and hopefully increase) their installed-bases
and put much efforts (e.g., marketing, subsidy, and
other investments) on competitive segments. Thus, the
actual behavior of platforms could be described as
seeking for an optimal balance between the net
increase of the bases and the amount of efforts
invested. Accordingly, the platform is assumed to focus
only on the gains from the newcomers in both sides
( ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ) in 𝑡𝑡 . Now, the platform faces the
following decision problem in each period of time 𝑡𝑡.
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.

ζ𝑡𝑡

Π𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎⋅∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏⋅∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐⋅ζ𝑡𝑡
0 ≤ ζ𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡

Eq. 3

The payoff is comprised of the net earning
increments from both sides and the investment
expenditure. Since ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and/or ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 may be negative
(e.g., when there are more playerseither users or
suppliersleaving the ecosystem than those joining it
in 𝑡𝑡), Eq. (3) actually could mean a loss minimization
in some periods. We will derive the net changes later
(refer to Eq. (6) and (7) and the notion of ‘critical
player’ introduced just before these equations).
The platform also needs to deliberate on the
investment. Indeed, many studies on platform
businesses assert that one of practical challenges they
are facing (in particular, at the early stage of launching
and stabilizing the platform) is to commit a big
investment in order to keep running the projects for
redesigning the value creation mechanism and
enhancing associated value flows. We will also show
that both ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 are the functions of ζ𝑡𝑡 in our
dynamics introduced and analyzed in the next section.
Accordingly, the optimization problem above is not
trivial as shown in Proposition 5 in Section 4.
However, the amount of investment is bounded by
the available budget at the current time, which is also
dynamically determined by the ultimate sources of the
gains from its value creation. The value created in the
platform ecosystem is fed back to the system in the
next period. The ecosystem grows based on this
feedback mechanism, which specifies the dynamics of
our stylized model. That is, a large portion of this
feedback flows throughout the entire ecosystem and
eventually affects the platform’s capability such as
financial budget. Thus, the budget capacity in the next
period 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 will be adjusted due to the change in the
number of active players, the idiosyncratic asset of the

platform according to RBV. Specifically, investment
capability of the platform changes according to not
only ∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 but also ∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 . The rate of change in 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 is
assumed to be proportional to a convex combination of
the rates of changes in 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 . With 𝛾𝛾 for this
parameter, Eq. (4) represents a general representation
of the budget dynamics from 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 to 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 .
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 �1 + 𝛾𝛾

∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝑢𝑢t

, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.

+ (1 − 𝛾𝛾)

∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡

�

Eq. 4

Note that the payoffs are determined in a nonlinear
way and the ecosystem creates the value differently
from what traditional value chains do. For example, the
platform should take care of not only its profit but also
the holistic ecosystem. Therefore, the payoff function
of the platform becomes quite different from the
additive form employed in linear value chain models.
Another major distinction comes from the
interrelationship between users and suppliers. The
relationships among the three players form a triad. That
is, the connection between a user and a supplier is
established via the platform while the actual service
flows (business transactions) occur between the user
and the supplier. This feature is reflected in the way of
determining 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 , the service fee between users and
suppliers at time period 𝑡𝑡. Unlike traditional value
chains where a keystone player with negotiation power
usually sets and controls 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 , the major revenue streams
for the platform come from the size of participants in
its ecosystem. Since our model assumes a plentiful of
users and suppliers, the price 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 will be determined by
the typical principle of supply and demand; that is,
both users and suppliers behave as a price taker.
Accordingly, we incorporate an adaptive dynamics
frequently employed in the studies with the supplydemand interactions above. Thus, the price change ∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡
is supposed to follow the equation below:
∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢

∆𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡

− 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠

∆𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡

Eq. 5

, where 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢 and 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 are positive constant weights (< 1).

Lastly, the number of users [suppliers] in the next
time period is determined by a convex combination of
the current size 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ] and the deviation from the
‘critical’ size 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ], where 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 is defined as the
corresponding index of the user [supplier] who is
indifferent between joining and leaving the system: i.e.,
𝜇𝜇(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) = 0 [𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) = 0]. Note first that the critical user
[supplier] is well defined since users [suppliers] are
arranged and indexed in descending [ascending] order
of 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) [𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠)] over U [S]. Thus, the critical user
[supplier] may well represent the expected size of
active users [suppliers].
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Δ𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 )
Δ𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽(𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 )
, where 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 1.

Eq. 6
Eq. 7

Here, 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are adjustment parameters (as γ
in Eq. 4) in the respective adaptive processes. For
example, 𝛼𝛼 = 1, users instantaneously respond to the
critical player ( 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ), and rapidly adjust themselves
toward the point. With 𝛼𝛼 [𝛽𝛽] = 0, meanwhile, users
[suppliers] do not switch and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ] remains fixed.
For example, with given ζ𝑡𝑡 set by the platform
and other parameters at the beginning of 𝑡𝑡, (potential)
users decide whether to join the ecosystem or not. They
regard the number of suppliers 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 as given at the
moment (actually updated at the end of the previous
period; i.e., 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ). In the course of (potential)
users’ movement—staying, joining, and leaving—, the
critical user 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 is determined. It will be quite common
in practice, however, that there is a gap between the
expected number of users (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ) and the size of actual
users at the beginning (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 ), which results in 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ≠ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
in general. The same adjustment procedure applies to
the supplier side (with 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 , and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ( ≠ 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 in
usual)). Because of these mismatches, some users
and/or suppliers may experience negative payoffs for a
while. Upon this gap, the size of active users
[suppliers] in the next period, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1 [𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1] is adjusted
based on Eq. (6) [Eq. (7)]. Fig. 1 summaries the event
sequence in our stylized adjustment process.

Figure 1. Timeline
Platform’s investment decision is assumed to be accomplished at the
beginning of each time period. This action triggers the adjustment
process and eventually leads to a new state for the next period 𝑡𝑡+1.

3.2 Steady state equilibrium analysis

We now analyze the steady state equilibriums in the
platform ecosystem with respect to the payoff
functions (Eq. (1) and (2)). First, we define the
possible types of equilibrium as follows:
 Interior equilibrium (eq.): �𝑢𝑢 ∗ , 𝑠𝑠 ∗ �, where 𝑢𝑢∗ and
𝑠𝑠 ∗ belong to (0, 𝑢𝑢�) and (0, 𝑠𝑠̅), respectively,
 Boundary eq. at the full saturation: �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠̅�,
 Boundary eq.’s of partial saturation: �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 � or

�𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠̅ �, where 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 < 𝑢𝑢� and 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑠𝑠̅,
 Boundary eq. at the complete collapse: (0, 0).

We do not consider the equilibria where only one
side (user or supplier) vanishes in the ecosystem. That
is, we accept neither �0, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 � nor �𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 , 0� as an
admissible state. This exclusion is quite reasonable
since they look absurd; for instance, �0, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 � means a
certain number of suppliers without a single user.
The following Proposition says that the boundary
equilibrium at the complete collapse (0, 0) could be a
Nash equilibrium. (Since we deal with a steady state,
we omit the subscript ‘𝑡𝑡’ in the following propositions
and explanations for readability.)
Proposition 1 (Complete Collapse Nash Equilibrium)
The boundary equilibrium where both sides of the
ecosystem collapse is a Nash equilibrium if 𝑟𝑟 > 0.
Proof

(Omitted; to be provided upon request)

One needs to be careful when interpreting
Proposition 1. First of all, the condition (𝑟𝑟 > 0) is not a
sufficient one. That is, there could be many
possibilities where other types of state become
equilibrium with 𝑟𝑟 > 0. Thus, we should not conclude
that the collapse is more likely to occur in the platform
ecosystem. On the contrary, it will be shown that other
types of the boundary equilibriums are rather more
prevalent not only in practice but also in theory.
Numerical simulations in the next section also
demonstrate that the collapse does not seem prevalent
in the platform ecosystem.
Now, it is necessary to examine the other states for
a Nash equilibrium. For this purpose, we first need to
explicitly express the critical players in terms of the
corresponding parameters and the decision variable of
the platform. For example, the critical user in our
model locates at 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = 𝜇𝜇 −1 (0). First, we assume that
all the players are homogenous: i.e., 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑 for all
𝑢𝑢 ∈ U and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞 for all 𝑠𝑠 ∈ S, where both 𝑑𝑑 and
q are positive constants. After analyzing the
homogenous case, we deal with the heterogeneous
players in one side with linear differentiation (e.g.,
𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 , where 𝑞𝑞 is a positive constant). More
general cases where both users and suppliers are
heterogeneous will be dealt with in the experiments.
The following Propositions present possible steady
state equilibriums together with respective conditions
under the corresponding assumptions on homogeneity
of players. Since the complete collapse state also
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the following cases
(note that there is no restriction on the players’ variety
in Proposition 1), we omit this boundary equilibrium
in our statement of the following Propositions.
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Proposition 2 (Homogenous Players)
Suppose that ζ be given by the platform. In the
platform ecosystem with homogeneous players (i.e.,
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞, 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑞𝑞 are constants), we
can observe in a steady state that the full saturation
state �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠̅� becomes a Nash equilibrium when the
following inequalities hold:
𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟ζ
≤ 𝑠𝑠̅ ≤
𝑢𝑢� .
Proof

𝑑𝑑ζ

𝑞𝑞

(Omitted; to be provided upon request)

The proof of Proposition 2 also implies that there
is no interior equilibrium in the case of homogeneous
players. Furthermore, the other types of boundary
equilibriums except the full saturation state (i.e., partial
saturation states) cannot be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium. This implies a possible contingency where
the installed-bases determine the platform’s maximum
payoffs, thereby serving as an ultimate source of
platform’s growth. The platform’s investment,
however, is also involved in this contingency (refer to
the condition in Proposition 2, which holds for large
investment (ζ)). In sum, homogeneous participants, as
idiosyncratic assets for the platform (RBV), may exert
influence on the ecosystem, but this potential can be
realized and enhanced through the platform’s efforts to
improve the relevant transactions (TCV).
Proposition 3 (Heterogeneous Suppliers)
Suppose that ζ be determined and given. In the
platform ecosystem with homogeneous users (𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) =
𝑑𝑑) and heterogeneous suppliers with 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 (the
second 𝑞𝑞 is a positive constant), we can observe in a
steady state that each of the following states becomes a
Nash equilibrium when the corresponding conditions
are satisfied. Here, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 = �𝑟𝑟ζ𝑢𝑢�⁄𝑞𝑞:
a) �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠̅� , the boundary equilibrium at the full
saturation state with 𝑟𝑟⁄(𝑑𝑑ζ) ≤ 𝑠𝑠̅ ≤ 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 ,
b) �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 � , the boundary equilibrium at a partial
saturation state with 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ⁄�𝑑𝑑 2 ζ3 � < 𝑢𝑢� and 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑠𝑠̅.
Proof

(Omitted; to be provided upon request)

Similar to the all-homogeneous case, an interior
equilibrium does not exist. However, we now have
another type of boundary equilibrium with a partial
saturation in the supplier side. To put this situation in
another way, even with the saturation of the user side,
there are some suppliers who would not join the
ecosystem due to their inefficiencies in making
business transactions with users. Examining 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 in the
Proposition, we know that increasing investment will
maneuver the partial saturation state into the full
saturation one (i.e., increasing 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 beyond 𝑠𝑠̅) since it

reduces the transaction costs and makes suppliers’
participation more affordable.
Proposition 4 (Heterogeneous Users)
Suppose that ζ be determined and given. In the
platform ecosystem with homogeneous suppliers
( 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞 ) and heterogeneous users with 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) =
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢� − 𝑢𝑢) (the second 𝑑𝑑 is a positive constant), we
can observe [cannot observe] in a steady state that the
following candidate states constitutes a Nash
equilibrium when the corresponding condition holds:
a) �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 �, where 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝑠𝑠̅ ], cannot be a boundary
equilibrium with 𝑟𝑟 > 0,
b) �𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠̅ �, where 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 = 𝑢𝑢� − 𝑟𝑟⁄(𝑑𝑑ζ𝑠𝑠̅), is a boundary
equilibrium at the partial saturation state with 𝑢𝑢� >
1 𝑟𝑟
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠̅
� + �.
ζ

𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠̅

Proof

𝑟𝑟

(Omitted; to be provided upon request)

The analytical results about the steady state
equilibriums in the platform ecosystem indicate that
the heterogeneity of players has an effect on the
structure of the equilibriums. For example, there is a
possibility of the full saturation in the case of
homogeneous users (Proposition 2 and a) in
Proposition 3); whereas the full saturation state cannot
be a boundary equilibrium with heterogeneous users
due to the following interactions between users and
suppliers (when other parameters remain the same).
Once the behavior dynamics (Eq. (6) and (7)) leads the
state to a point near to �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠̅�, some users may find
out that it is not beneficial to stay in the ecosystem and
start to leave it. In the course of this adjustment, the
dynamics cannot keep pushing the state toward the
corner point �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠̅�, and it settles down at �𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐 , 𝑠𝑠̅�
in the end (see b) in Proposition 4). This asymmetry
seems to arise from the difference in the mechanism
where the platform’s investment ζ affects the
respective players’ payoffs.
Facing the situations where at least one side is
composed of heterogeneous participants, the platform’s
leading role through investments seems more crucial to
fostering the ecosystem than other initiatives directly
aiming at the installed-bases. In other words, with
heterogeneous participant configuration (e.g., highly
differentiated), transaction efficiency is essential to
triggering the ecosystem growth (TCV). Meanwhile,
the role of active players as idiosyncratic resource
(RBV) is relatively meager; once started, the dynamics
draws participants until it reaches a partial saturation.
The platform’s decision on the investment scale
also plays an important role in determining boundary
equilibriums in the contingencies above. For example,
the full saturation as an equilibrium with homogeneous
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users requires that the platform should maintain a large
amount of investment (refer to the inequalities in
Proposition 2 and those in a) of Proposition 3). The
boundary equilibrium that occurs along the edge of
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑠̅ (i.e., saturation of supplier side) with
heterogeneous users (refer to b) in Proposition 4) also
presumes a sufficient amount of investment from the
platform. Also note that 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 → 𝑠𝑠̅ in Proposition 3 and
𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐 → 𝑢𝑢� in Proposition 4 as ζ increases sufficiently.
Therefore, we need to explicitly consider the
platform’s investment decision (ζ), which will be dealt
with in the next section in a more general framework
(i.e., heterogeneities both in users and in suppliers).
The analytical results in this section have been
derived from a long-term perspective which presumes
that the decision of the platform is stabilized. The
actual dynamics, however, could alter the static
equilibrium especially when the equilibrium causes a
behavioral change of the platform and destroys the
condition for the corresponding equilibrium.
Unfortunately, one could not conduct a rigorous
analysis for such possibilities without resorting to some
numerical simulations. In the next section, we present a
series of experiments and investigate some growth
paths that representative scenarios could generate.

4. Dynamics simulations and discussions
In this section, the equilibriums in a platform
ecosystem are analyzed by explicitly incorporating the
platform’s dynamics and decisions. We first derive the
optimal decision of the platform. Here, it is assumed
that the platform’s moves are myopic (with its best
guess about the change during the period), even though
it can produce an optimal outcome in some periods.
For the sake of explicit analysis, linear differentiation
functions for 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) are assumed as before,
that is, 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢� − 𝑢𝑢) and 𝑞𝑞(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, where both
𝑑𝑑 and 𝑞𝑞 are positive constants (also see Propositions
3 and 4). Thus, we now consider a more general
situation in which both users and suppliers are
heterogeneous. Then, on the basis of the decision rule
below, we conduct a series of numerical simulations to
examine the dynamic performance of the ecosystem.
Proposition 5 (Optimal Decision of Platform)
Given 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 , 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 and 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 (all positive) at the
beginning of period 𝑡𝑡 , let’s define three constants
(over time period 𝑡𝑡 ) Φ𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 , Θ𝑡𝑡 ≡
�𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 ⁄(𝑑𝑑Φ𝑡𝑡 ) (defined only for positive Φ𝑡𝑡 ) and
Ψ𝑡𝑡 ≡ �𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ⁄(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ) . Platform’s optimal decision in
Eq. (3) on the amount of investment ζ∗𝑡𝑡 at 𝑡𝑡 follows
the rule below:
CASE Ⅰ: 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 belong to (0, 𝑢𝑢�) and (0, 𝑠𝑠̅) resp.

(1) if Φ𝑡𝑡 > 0 and Θ𝑡𝑡 < 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 then ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = Θ𝑡𝑡 ,
(2) otherwise, ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 .
CASE Ⅱ: Either 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 or 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (but not both) is out of its
respective range, (0, 𝑢𝑢�) or (0, 𝑠𝑠̅).
(3) with 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 < 0 (and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝑠𝑠̅)), ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 if Φ𝑡𝑡 > 0
and ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = 0 otherwise.
(4) with 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑠𝑠̅ (and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝑢𝑢�)), ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = Ψ𝑡𝑡 if Ψ𝑡𝑡 ≤
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 and ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 otherwise.
CASE Ⅲ: Neither 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 nor 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 belongs to its resp. set.
(6) ζ∗𝑡𝑡 = 0.
Proof

(Omitted; to be provided upon request)

With the optimal responses of the platform
summarized in Propositions 5 and the dynamics
described by Eq. (4)-(7), a series of simulations are
carried out. On the basis of these experiments, we
ascertain whether the active players constitute effective
resources for the platform (as RBV asserts) and
whether the investment to improve the transaction
efficiency effectively nurtures the ecosystem (as TCV
asserts). We are also interested in some factors that are
most influential in leading the ecosystem to a specific
state (or scenario). In particular, we try to understand
the relevant contingencies and the drivers in terms of
either RBV or TCV or both. Along this line, we
employ the following performance measures.
 The sizes of active players in period 𝑡𝑡: 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ,
 The platform’s profit and capital turnover (rate) at 𝑡𝑡:
Π𝑡𝑡 and 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 ≡ Π𝑡𝑡 ⁄ζ𝑡𝑡−1 ,
 The average payoffs of active players at 𝑡𝑡: 𝜇𝜇̅𝑡𝑡 ≡
1 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡
1 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
∫0 𝜇𝜇(𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 and 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡 ≡ ∫0 𝜋𝜋(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 .
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡

𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡

These measures are developed to answer our
research questions raised in Introduction. For example,
the scales of active players (𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 ) are directly
linked with our first question that whether the active
players could reinforce the platform’s leadership in the
ecosystem, thereby playing the role of an idiosyncratic
asset, as suggested by RBV. Furthermore, the capital
turnover (𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 ) in the second performance measure is
devised to determine the platform’s incentive to
enhance its infrastructure for improving its transaction
efficiency, primarily from the perspective of TCV. The
last two measures ( 𝜇𝜇̅𝑡𝑡 and 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡 ) monitor the
effectiveness of the platform’s activity (e.g.,
investment) in creating a virtuous cycle throughout an
ecosystem, thereby sustaining and fostering the whole
ecosystem. Evaluating the platform ecosystem from a
wide range of angles will enhance our understanding of
the platform’s role as a keystone player ([15] [18]).
The following figures depict outcomes from an
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example in which the parameters are fixed at certain
values (for details, please refer to the description of the
baseline experiments given below Fig. 2). We tried
tuning the parameters throughout some pilot tests. For
example, speed parameters such as 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 were
tuned to be small; otherwise, the system adjusts itself
too fast to properly reveal its dynamic behavior.
Despite small 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 , the platform ecosystem
stabilized in all the instances we tried. Thus, this
manipulation for slow adaptation is maintained in the
following simulation results.
The simulation outcomes are categorized into some
typical patterns, which could be justified by extensive
trials rich enough to encompass a large number of
instances. Fig. 2 demonstrates three most typical
patterns of the system behavior.

depict the outcomes under Scenarios A and B. They
show plots for the two performance measures of the
platform against the market scale in the early phase as
well as near the last phase. In many experiments, we
observed that the overall qualitative aspects (e.g.,
pattern and graph shape) of the system behavior (in
terms of the respective measure) remained unchanged.

(a) Profit: early vs. steady

(b) CT: early vs. steady

Figure 3. Changes in Platform’s Profits and Capital
Turnover (CT) in Scenario A

(a) Scenario A

(b) Scenario B

(c) Scenario C

Figure 2. Changes in Users and Suppliers

We set the parameters at the following numerical values: α = β =
0.1, γ = 0.5, 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = 0.5 and 𝑢𝑢� = 𝑠𝑠̅ = 100. As the initial states,
we set 𝑢𝑢0 = 𝑠𝑠0 = 50, 𝑟𝑟0 = 2, and 𝐵𝐵0 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. For the first two
scenarios, we set d = 10 and q = 1 in order to make the comparisons
as fair as possible. However, these settings cannot be maintained for
generating the all-collapse case; we should, for example, set d = 1
and q = 10 to craft Scenario C. Note that the platform’s cost is set to
be one for all the three scenarios. We run the simulations over 100
time periods (see the horizontal line). These parameters as well as
the initial states remain same in the following figures.

Each scenario corresponds to a specific steady-state
equilibrium suggested in the previous section. For
example, Scenarios B and C represent full saturation
and complete collapse, respectively. Scenario A shows
a partial saturation instance that resembles the
equilibrium �𝑢𝑢�, 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 � in Proposition 3, though the
context assumed there (i.e., homogenous users) is
different from that assumed in the simulation (i.e.,
heterogeneous players). Also note that the small
difference between perfectly homogeneous users in
Proposition 3 and a little heterogeneity of users in
Scenario C produces opposite outcomes: the (possible)
full saturation in the former vs. the complete collapse
in the latter. In particular, Scenario C implies a specific
contingency where neither active players nor
platform’s investment works for prosperity of the
ecosystem. Strong heterogeneities (particularly, across
suppliers) seems like a source of this contingency.
We focus on the first two scenarios: Scenarios A
and B. Fig. 3 and 4 display and compare changes in the
profits and capital turnover of the platform both in the
early phase and steady state; Fig. 3 and 4 respectively

(a) Profit: early vs. steady

(b) CT: early vs. steady

Figure 4. Changes in Platform’s Profits and Capital
Turnover (CT) in Scenario B

Both scenarios show that the platform’s profit
increases as more players join the ecosystem (Fig. 3(a)
and 4(a)). Thus, the outcomes seem to support the
argument that users and suppliers play the role of
idiosyncratic assets, as asserted by RBV ([25]).
Considering the capital turnover as the measure of the
platform’s performance (Fig. 3(b) and 4(b)), however,
we see an opposite relation between the ecosystem
scale and platform’s performance. Thus, we could not
uniformly conclude that active users and suppliers
constitute the ultimate source of profitability for the
platform. We need to further investigate the role of
investment at the level of the holistic ecosystem.
The following figures display and compare changes
in the average payoffs of active players against the
amount of investment in the previous time period
(since our event sequence assumes that the players’
adjustments are completed at the end of a period while
the investment is in effect from the beginning of the
period). Both Scenarios A and B result in similar
outcomes. For example, the average payoff of active
users consistently improves as the investment increases
(Fig. 5(a) and 6(a)) thanks to the platform’s efforts to
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enhance the service value through investments. On the
other hand, the average payoff of active suppliers
increases along the scale of investment in the early
phase; however, near the steady state, they eventually
settle down at a point, which is lower than the ones in
the starting periods (Fig. 5(b) and 6(b)). This drop in
efficiency gain is attributable to the congestion effect,
which becomes stronger as the user side gets saturated
(also note that the platform’s investment becomes fixed
as the ecosystem approaches to a stead state). Thus, the
average gain of active suppliers results in an inverted
U-shape. This phenomenon seems to be independent of
the size of active players since the numbers of active
suppliers in the steady state differ between the two
scenarios ( 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 → 𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐 in Scenario A and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 → 𝑠𝑠̅ (i.e.,
saturated) in Scenario B). The different behaviors
between users and suppliers result from the different
payoff structures (see Eq. (1) and (2)), particularly
owing to the congestion factor (i.e., the negative
network externality) in the suppliers’ payoff.

those of participants in Fig. 7. Here, we observe coprosperity in both scenarios at least in the early phase,
which implies a positive feedback loop of payoff
streams for all the participants in an ecosystem. This
co-prosperity, however, ends when one side (here, the
user side) reaches the saturation state. Thereafter, the
platform starts to rein back the investment (not
displayed in the figures), and some suppliers suffer
from increased transaction costs despite having
enjoyed the saturated user side. Furthermore,
diminishing average payoff on the supplier side could
be aggravated owing to the congestion effect.

(a) Scenario A

(b) Scenario B

Figure 7. Profitability Links in Platform Ecosystem

(a) User AP: early vs. steady

(b) Suppl. AP: early vs. steady

Figure 5. Changes in Avg. Payoffs (AP) in Scenario A

(a) User AP: early vs. steady

(b) Suppl. AP: early vs. steady

Figure 6. Changes in Avg. Payoffs (AP) in Scenario B

However, this contrast between the users and
suppliers should not lead to an underestimation of the
role of investment in creating value and nurturing the
ecosystem. Particularly, the active playersboth users
and suppliersin the early phase enjoy positive payoff
streams thanks to the platform investment, since it
reduces the costs for transactions between two groups,
as asserted by TCV. Players’ gain or loss may result
from sacrifice by or exploitation of the platform in the
course of its value creation and propagation.
To examine more closely these profitability links,
we demonstrate the platform’s payoffs together with

Thus far, our experiments show that a platform
ecosystem is able to sustainably leverage idiosyncratic
assets as well as transaction efficiency, the two key
notions that constitute the modern firm theory.
However, users and suppliers not only serve as
assets but also consume other platform resources.
Accordingly, they cannot be as perfectly idiosyncratic
as a proprietary asset that is not available to the
participants. Furthermore, the congestion effect on one
side (here, the supplier side) is likely to undermine the
potential of active participants. This presents a
challenge to discover another core asset for a platform
ecosystem, which better complies with RBV.
On the other hand, the function of investment for
improving the transaction efficiency between the
participants seems more critical to ecosystem
management. The platform’s efforts to reduce
transaction costs foster the entire ecosystem and
coincide with participants’ proliferation (at least in the
early phase of its growth in Fig. 7). Further, some
contingencies such as heterogeneity in participants
dwarf the potential of active players as idiosyncratic
assets for the platform. Subsequently, the following
hypothesis could be proposed; “with heterogeneous
participants, the fundamental rationale of existence of
the platform stems from its initiatives more compatible
with TCV than RBV.” Going one step further, our
findings also confirm a general observation on the
typical life-cycle behavior of the platform ecosystem
and explain this behavioral pattern. That is, a platform
starts to create a marketplace and promote its
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ecosystem, and after building up a certain scale of
installed-base, it maneuvers the ecosystem toward a
hierarchy. And platform’s investments work as a main
driver that leads and moderates this movement along
the spectrum of market vs. hierarchy.
This point provides insight into the platform’s role
in its ecosystem. For example, the platform needs to
conduct a maneuver for the congestion side and
suppress surging participants, if necessary, for
sustainable growth of its ecosystem. (This point also
explains another reason for the scale of the participants
not being a perfect asset for the platform.) This kind of
admission control is what Apple is pursuing as a part of
its Appstore policy. Selective permission for being a
supplier to the platform (Appstore) alleviates the
congestion effect and maintains a certain level of
quality, which is essential for a healthy ecosystem.

5. Conclusion
This study presents a stylized model for dynamic
nonlinear value creation across multiple players in a
platform ecosystem. The proposed model incorporates
two perspectives of firm theories to help understand
the roles of a platform and the fundamental organizing
principle of its ecosystem. RBV considers the
participants—users and suppliers—as not only clients
but also assets of the platform; meanwhile, TCV
provides the reason for the existence of the platform: to
reduce the transaction costs across the participants. Our
models together with analyses and experiments suggest
that the fundamental role of a platform lies in
controlling the transactions across its participants,
moving along the spectrum of market vs. hierarchy.
Leveraging both market and organization, as platforms
do, may provide a hint for a prototype of IT-intensive
service operations encompassing newly emerging O2O
(online-to-offline) services.
Since our results are based on the stylized,
conceptual model, they have some limits when
applying to real cases. First, some simplifying
assumptions in the model (e.g., Eq. (3)) may restrict
platform’s behavior and lead the entire ecosystem
toward some specific directions. The context of this
study is limited, too. For example, the current approach
considers neither vertical differentiation strategy of the
platform nor collaborations among the suppliers.
Lastly, the current framework needs to be extended to
incorporate competing platforms, which probably
affects the entire dynamics.
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